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Unfunded pension liabilities and sponsoring firm credit risk: 
An international analysis of corporate bond spreads 
 
Ronan Gallagher and Donal McKillop∗ 
School of Management, Queen’s University, Belfast, BT7 1NN, UK 
 
This paper tests empirically whether pension information derived by corporate pension accounting 
disclosures is priced in corporate bond spreads. The model represents a hybrid of more traditional 
accounting ratio-based models of credit risk and structural models of bond spreads initiated by Merton 
(1974). The model is fitted to 5 years of data from 2002 to 2006 featuring companies from the US and 
Europe. The paper finds that while unfunded pension liabilities are priced in the overall sample, they 
are not priced as aggressively as traditional leverage. Furthermore, an extended model shows that the 
pension–credit risk relation is most evident in the US and Germany, where unfunded pension 
liabilities are priced more aggressively than traditional forms of leverage. No pension–credit risk 
relation is found in the other countries sampled, notably the UK, Netherlands and France. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The ‘perfect storm’1 of negative equity returns and low interest rates in the early years of this 
millennium has resulted in the majority of defined benefit pension schemes experiencing a deficit, 
whereby the liabilities of the scheme exceed the assets. In a defined benefit pension scheme, the 
benefit the members receive from the scheme is defined ex-ante. The scheme sponsor promises to pay 
a pension based on this defined benefit, whatever may be the size of the fund backing this promise. 
The plan sponsor typically makes all the decisions and is responsible for the funding adequacy of the 
plan. The sponsor bears the liability for future payments to retirees and assumes the risk if the fund 
under-performs or fails. By 2002, unfunded pension liabilities had become widespread throughout 
Europe and the US. In 2002, on average, firms were reporting a funding deficit of €733 million, €533 
million in 2003, €531 million in 2004, €556 million in 2005 and €337 million in 2006.2 
Commentators argue that the prevalence of underfunding stems from unsustainable improvements to 
defined benefit obligations over the past 50 years, which were made without appropriate assessment 
and acknowledgement of the inherent shortcomings in the defined benefit pensions framework. 
The relationship between the firm and its pension plan has been debated in the literature with 
two primary schools of thought emerging. One is the traditional approach which argues that there is a 
legal separation between the firm and the pension fund and this implies that funding positions should 
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be based on the future stream of employee pension liabilities, while the asset allocation should be 
made solely in the best interests of the beneficiaries. The alternative view, the corporate financial 
perspective, is favoured by economists and implies that defined benefit liabilities are just one more of 
a set of financial liabilities of the firm. As such the firm’s pension deficit/surplus belongs to its 
shareholders and the company will choose the structure of its assets and liabilities to maximize the 
value to shareholders. The corporate financial view explicitly ignores the interests of scheme 
beneficiaries. 
Consensus of opinion points to a general acceptance of the corporate financial perspective. 
The implication of this is that pension risk should be reflected in bond spreads and if so the debt 
market can be viewed as informationally efficient with regard to pension disclosures. This, however, 
may fail to recognize informational frictions. Clark and Monk (2007a, 2007b) identify three particular 
shortcomings, which contributed to the pension crisis. First, it is generally accepted that in the area of 
pension accounting, financial reporting has, at least in the past, been somewhat opaque. This led to 
extensive reform to accounting practices internationally, namely, FRS17, IAS19 and FAS158. 
Several studies have demonstrated that more transparent accounting standards negatively impact upon 
the valuation of those companies running pension plan deficits(e.g. Zion and Carache 2002; Franzoni 
and Marin 2006). Second, the lack of consistency of actuarial assumptions is utilized in the 
calculation of pension plan funding. Punter Southall (2007) reveal significant variability in actuarial 
assumptions pertaining to the discount rate, inflation rate, salary increases, return on equity and 
mortality rates. Third, the role of a pension benefit guarantee fund, as guarantor of pension benefits, 
may cloud the relationship between the risk of the pension plan and the market risk.3  
Set against the backdrop of informational frictions, the present study explores whether 
corporate pension accounting disclosures with respect to defined benefit pension schemes are priced 
in corporate bond spreads. The analysis is undertaken for firms whose bonds are constituents of the 
IBOXX European Corporate Bond Index4 and estimated in a panel framework for the 2002–2006 
period. Our analysis reveals that, in general, pension risk is priced in corporate spreads and lends 
support to the view that debt markets are informationally efficient with regard to pension disclosures. 
There is, however, some cross country variation in the findings with some evidence of a break in our 
general findings for the UK, the Netherlands and France. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we explore the theoretical 
and empirical literature examining the relationship between the pension plan and the firm. Section 3 
identifies the sources of data used in the study and defines the variables used. This is followed in 
Section 4 by an outline of the model specifications fitted to the data and in Section 5 by the empirical 
results and their discussion. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Literature 
 
In this section, we consider literature that explores the theoretical and empirical relationships between 
the defined benefit pension scheme and the firm. The theoretical foundations in the literature have 
been examined empirically with reference to both corporate debt and equity. Although the 
relationship between the pension scheme and the firm equity is not part of our empirical investigation, 
we will consider some of the key papers in this area as they offer tangential insight into the pension 
scheme—corporate debt relationship. 
 
2.1 Two theoretical schools of thought 
 
There are two theoretical schools of thought on whether pension risk impacts upon firm risk: the 
traditional approach and the corporate financial approach. The former asserts that there is generally a 
legal separation between the company and its pension fund and therefore the fund should be managed 
without regard to the corporate financial policy or the interests of the shareholders. From this 
traditional stance, it is implied that funding positions should be based on the future stream of 
employee pension liabilities, while the asset allocation should be made solely in the best interests of 
the beneficiaries. However, consensus on the asset allocation that is best for beneficiaries is often 
unclear. If the scheme is set-up in such a way that beneficiaries cannot share any surplus of pension 
assets over liabilities, they are likely to prefer a well funded plan to be invested in the least risky 
assets, in all likelihood fixed income securities. On the other hand, if beneficiaries are allowed to 
share the surplus, as documented by Miller and Scholes (1981), Bulow and Scholes 
(1982) and Carroll and Niehaus (1998), then virtually any asset mix can be justified and the optimal 
asset allocation becomes unclear. 
In contrast, the corporate financial perspective implies that defined benefit liabilities are just 
one more of a set of financial liabilities of the firm. Black (2006) states that “because pension benefits 
are normally independent of fund performance, pension assets impact the firm very much as if they 
were firm assets”. In essence, the firm’s pension deficit/surplus belongs to its shareholders and the 
company will chose the structure of its assets and liabilities to maximize the value to shareholders. 
The corporate financial perspective is now generally accepted both theoretically and empirically, see, 
for example, the early works of Tepper (1981), Bodie et al (1986), Black (2006) and later studies by 
Cardinale (2006) and Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006). 
In the corporate financial perspective, the interests of scheme beneficiaries are considered to 
be protected by the government and a key tool of corporate financial policy is the game between the 
corporations and the various government agencies that ultimately decides the outcome of corporate 
pension decisions. Bodie et al. (1986) subdivide this game into three core areas, namely: the tax 
shelter effect; the financial slack effect and pension optionalities. The tax shelter property arises from 
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the fact the firm is able to borrow the after-tax rate of interest, while the pension fund is able to earn 
the pre-tax rate of interest. Therefore, it is more advantageous for the company to borrow and transfer 
the proceeds to the pension fund to invest in bonds.5 The financial slack effect is closely linked to the 
tax shelter effect and centres upon the fact that the managers are likely to have better information 
about a firm’s prospects than outsiders. Consequently, the managers have an incentive to issue stock 
when they believe it is overpriced and knowing this the investors react negatively to a stock issue. It is 
therefore desirable for the managers to maintain some financial slack to avoid a stock issue. Typically, 
this slack can be held as liquid assets, unused debt capacity or pension assets, while the latter is much 
more advantageous for tax purposes. Finally, pension optionality research focuses on the presence of 
pension benefit guarantee schemes, which underwrite a sponsor’s pension promise. This essentially 
creates a put option (see Sharpe 1976; Treynor 1977) for the firm and correspondingly an incentive 
for corporate managers to maximise the value of this put option and consequently shareholder value 
by investing in the riskiest equities.6 
So far we have focused on two extremes in terms of how the scheme is managed with respect 
to the interests of the beneficiaries and shareholders. For example, at one extreme, we have the 
corporate financial perspective which implies that the scheme management should explicitly ignore 
the interests of beneficiaries. However, in many countries pension regulation requires scheme trustees 
who take strong independent steps to protect the interests of the scheme beneficiaries. Trustees need 
to perform regular reviews (Employer Covenant Reviews) of the financial strength of the sponsoring 
employer to ensure that it can meet its obligations to the scheme. This clearly enforces a compromise 
under which the scheme must be managed in the interests of both beneficiaries and shareholders. 
 
2.2 The pension fund and corporate equity 
 
There is a substantial literature in economics and finance studying ‘value transparency’ or whether 
pension assets and liabilities affect the market valuation of firms. One of the earlier studies in this area 
was conducted by Feldstein and Seligman (1981). They found that the growth of unfunded pension 
liabilities is a key contributor for the poor performance of share prices relative to book values and 
earnings. A more sophisticated paper by Feldstein and Morck (1985) utilizing homogeneity of interest 
rate assumptions finds that the market appears to see through the ‘pension accounting veil’ and sets 
market values that are more closely related to a pension obligation valued at a standard common 
interest rate rather than the pension obligations reported by firms. Bulow, Morck, and Summers 
(1987) support these earlier findings and report that ‘the stock market valuation of firms reasonably 
reflects their pension funding situations’. 
Given the perfect storm and corresponding pensions’ crisis that emerged from 2000 onwards, 
Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) examined whether the systematic equity risk of US firms as measured 
by beta from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) reflects the risk of their pension plan. 
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By using data on circa 4500 US companies over the years 1993–1998 and controlling firm-specific 
risk factors and fixed effects at the industry level, the authors find that equity betas of firms do appear 
to accurately reflect the betas of their pension assets and liabilities, which are consistent with efficient 
capital markets. 
Franzoni and Marin (2006) examine pension plan funding and market efficiency and find that 
the market significantly overvalues firms with severely underfunded pension plans. The evidence 
presented reveals that companies earn lower raw and risk-adjusted stock returns than firms with 
healthier pension plans for at least 5 years after the first emergence of the underfunding. 
The lower returns are reasoned by the authors to be due to the fact that investors are systematically 
surprised by the negative impact of the pension underfunding on earnings and cash flows. 
Given the highly complex nature of pension accounting, a significant tranche of the literature 
is devoted to the relationship between differing pension accounting standards and the market 
valuation of unfunded pension liabilities. Coronado and Sharpe (2003) contend that accounting 
earnings and costs associated with pension plans are often a very misleading measure of the 
underlying value of net pension obligations; the implication being that the stocks of a number of 
S&P500 firms, who sponsor defined benefit schemes, were overvalued over the sample period 1993–
2001. The authors state that pension information contained in the footnotes to accounts is frequently 
overlooked in equity valuation. Research conducted by Coronado et al. (2008) focuses on the period 
2002–2005, when huge variations in pension valuations encouraged increased scrutiny from analysts 
and policyholders. Despite this heightened attention they conclude that the equity values of defined 
benefit sponsoring companies continue to inadequately reflect the true economic value of pension 
assets and liabilities. Instead, company valuations appear unduly influenced by the accrual reported on 
the company income statement, while placing little emphasis on the incremental information reported 
in the footnotes. Although in aggregate the errors estimated are not large they can be significant for 
individual companies. They suggest that ongoing financial accounting standards reform will result in 
the migration of key footnote information to the balance sheet. Picconi (2006) arrives at a similarly 
pessimistic conclusion regarding the ability of investors and analysts to fully process the information 
available under Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS)87, suggesting that both analysts and the equity market only 
gradually reflect the pension plan information which exert a quantifiable impact upon future (year-
ahead) earnings. 
 
2.3 The pension fund and corporate debt 
 
There is less literature examining the impact of corporate pension funding on credit ratings. Martin 
and Henderson (1983) examine the impact of the US Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) pension risk ratios on bond ratings. They examine a sample of 129 bonds over the period 
6 
 
1979–1980 and find that in addition to the classic predictors of credit risk (return on investment, 
leverage and times interest earned), the ERISA pension risk ratios, such as unfunded past service costs 
per employee and pension-related debt to stockholder equity, add significant value to the prediction of 
corporate credit ratings with the prediction improvement being greater for those bonds with the lowest 
ratings. 
Maher (1987) presents an analysis of the key determinants of bond ratings based on bonds 
taken from the S&P corporate bond guide over the period 1980–1982. The author finds that the actual 
pension numbers required to be disclosed by the prevailing accounting standard at the time (SFAS no. 
36) were not a significant determinant of the bond rating in any of the years studied. However, when 
these numbers were discounted at standardized interest rates several proved highly significant. The 
author also finds differential significance of the pension variable for companies running plan deficits 
rather than surpluses. The research suggests that a pension deficit is considered to be a corporate 
liability, while a pension surplus is not considered to be a corporate asset with regard to impacting 
upon corporate bond ratings. 
This asymmetry has also been a feature of subsequent research, such as the work of Carroll 
and Niehaus (1998). These authors use data over the period 1987–1994 from industrial firms on 
Compustat Annual Industrial files. They implement an ordered probit model of debt ratings 
controlling the non-pension plan-related risk variables and the evidence presented indicates that 
excess pension assets and unfunded pension liabilities influence debt ratings. Moreover, the paper 
reveals that unfunded pension liabilities decrease debt ratings more than what an equivalent amount of 
excess pension assets increase debt ratings, ceteris paribus. This asymmetric relationship is consistent 
with the view that unfunded pension liabilities are corporate liabilities that compete with debt claims, 
but there are costs associated with quickly accessing excess pension assets.7 
The impact of pension plan funding on credit ratings became a more pertinent issue in light of 
the increasing occurrence of underfunding that emanated from the ‘perfect storm’in the early years of 
the millennium. Rating agencies came under pressure to issue ratings methodology updates clarifying 
the impact of plan funding on the ratings that they produced. Correspondingly, Moody’s and Standard 
and Poor’s released updates in January 2003 and October 2004, respectively. Referring to the actions 
of the rating agencies, the 2004 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Global 
Financial Stability Report states: 
 
“Rating agencies now explicitly recognise the underfunded amount of pension plans as debt of the sponsor 
company. The rating agencies treat the difference between the PBO (Projected Benefit Obligation) and the fair 
value of plan assets like any other long-term obligation of the sponsor company.” 
 
Watson Wyatt Worldwide (2005) examine the relationship between pension plan funding, 
credit ratings and funding strategies. Using data from Fortune 1000 pension sponsors over 2002–
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2004, they find a notable positive relationship between higher pension deficits and lower credit 
ratings. 
In particular, they note that firms ratedAA have gained significantly more ground on their pension 
plans’ funding positions over the sample period than firms with lower ratings. 
An alternative indicator of risk in the debt markets is the spread on corporate debt, also known as 
credit spread. Cardinale (2006) presents an analysis of defined benefit pension plan funding on credit 
spreads. US data is taken from the financials and pension plan fundamentals of Fortune 1000 
companies with a defined benefit plan according to theWatsonWyatt Financial Accounting Standard 
(FAS) Survey over the period 2001–2004. UK data is taken from the Watson Wyatt Pension Finance 
Database of FTSE 350 UK companies over the same period. These fundamentals and pension plan 
data are matched with corporate spreads from Merrill Lynch Global Bond Index. 
The report finds that theUSbond market prices both absolute defined benefit liabilities and pension 
deficits. Furthermore, the US bond market prices deficits three times as aggressively as ordinary 
leverage. In the UK, the bond market processes pension information differently. Rather than pricing 
the pension deficit, the market prices absolute defined benefit liabilities. 
 
3. Sample determination 
 
The dataset thatwas used is taken from a combination of accounting and market sources. Bond data 
was taken from the IBOXX European Corporate Bond Index, supplemented with option adjusted 
spread data cross-referenced by bond ISIN from the Merrill Lynch EMU Corporate Index. All bonds 
in the sample were issued in Euro. Quite often, the name of the issuer proved ambiguous due to the 
presence of financing vehicles established as part of a firm’s structured debt management. 
In such cases, each bond was matched to an ultimate issuer by searching for the issuance note for each 
ISIN, which was sometimes available on the company’s websites or otherwise on the exchange 
websites. For each ultimate issuer, a Thomson entity key was generated. This entity key was then used 
to download all relevant company accounting data, including pension data, from Thomson One 
Banker’sWorldscope. The sample data was structured in the form of an unbalanced panel for the 
period 2002–2006 resulting in 1907 observations. The nature of the unbalanced panel stemmed from 
improvements to pension accounting disclosure over the sample period resulting in more observations 
post 2003 (see Table 1). Also highlighted in Table 1 are the countries of origin of the bond issuers 
with their distribution being a feature of the underlying bond index. Table 1 reveals the dominance of 
the Netherlands, the US, the UK, France and Germany. 
The hypothesis to be tested is that a higher pension plan risk translates into higher credit risk 
ceteris paribus. This therefore raises a question as to the measurement of the dependent variable. 
We have chosen to use the option adjusted spread (OAS) on corporate bonds as our measure of credit 
risk. The OAS is a flat spread over the treasury yield curve required to discount a security’s payments 
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to match its market price. All embedded optionality features (e.g. call, put or sinking funds) are 
therefore stripped out to ensure model consistency. The advantage of using spreads over credit ratings 
is the use of a market determined continuous variable as opposed to discrete rating categories. 
Summary information (the mean, median, quartile and standard deviation) of the credit risk measure 
is detailed in Table 2. The average OAS is 55 bp with a standard deviation of 34 bp. In Table 2, we 
present the natural log of the OAS as our specification is log linear. 
The key independent variable is that of pension plan risk.We detail four alternative measures 
based on balance sheet variables. The use of the balance sheet information is consistent with the 
WatsonWyatt pension risk index and the work, among others, of Carroll and Niehaus (1998) and Jin, 
Merton, and Bodie (2006). The alternate measures we use are defined as: (i) projected benefit 
obligation/total assets; (ii) projected benefit obligation/total debt; (iii) pension deficit/shareholder 
equity and (iv) pension deficit/total assets. These measures will hitherto be referred to as BS1 to BS4, 
respectively. Summary information on these alternate measures is provided in Table 2. 
From this table we can see that the average firm has pension liabilities amounting to 11.36% of their 
total assets and a pension deficit of 2.9% of their total assets. 
As will be explained in the next section, the model specification is a hybrid of traditional and 
structural models of credit risk. As a consequence, a selected number of control variables is 
additionally introduced into the model specifications. Traditional models propose variables such as 
short-term financial leverage (short-term debt/total assets: STLEV), long-term financial leverage 
(long-term debt/total assets: LTLEV), growth rate (log [total assets/lagged total assets]: GR), return 
on investment (net income/total assets: ROI) and firm size (log [total assets]: FS).  Structural models 
also suggest the inclusion of the financial leverage variables in addition to the term to maturity of the 
debt (measured in four consecutive time bands: up to 3 years, 3–5 years, 5–10 years and more than 10 
years) and the volatility of the firm’s assets/equity (VOL; theVOL is annualized and mean 
centred).We present summary information on these additional explanatory variables in Table 2. From 
the data, we note that the average firm in the sample has more long-term debt than short-term debt as 
a proportion of their total assets. Additionally, the average firm in the sample has a positive growth 
rate, GR and a positive return on investment, ROI. 
 
4. Model specification 
 
As noted in the previous section, there are two broad categories of models that attempt to measure 
credit risk: traditional and structural models. Traditional models use the tools of fundamental analysis 
to ascertain if a company exhibits certain characteristics that raise the default probability. 
These models examine factors such as cash flow adequacy, asset quality, earning performance and 
capital adequacy, drawing a small set of accounting variables, financial ratios and other information 
into a quantitative score. In some cases this score can literally be viewed as the probability of default, 
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whereas in others it is used as some sort of a classification system. Early work was based on 
multivariate linear discriminate analysis (e.g. Altman 1968). More recent work use logit and 
probit models and include Cantor and Packer (1996), Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998) and 
Pottier and Sommer (1999). 
Structural models build upon the contingent claims framework developed by Merton (1974). 
Merton expresses a firm’s risk neutral default probability and hence the spread on the debt that it 
issues, as a function of three primary variables namely: leverage, equity volatility8 and the time to 
maturity of the debt. The empirical performance of the Merton model has been a topic of considerable 
debate and refinements to the basic model suggested. Cardinale (2006) summarizes these refinements 
but notes that broad consistency emerges with regard to, for example, the identified relationship 
between credit spread and leverage. The empirical validity of the Merton framework is, however, 
emphasized by the fact that it underlies Moody’sKMVdefault probability model, which is a market 
leader.9 
Benos and Papanastasopoulos (2007) and Demirovic and Thomas (2007), among others, find 
that application of the structural and traditional models need not necessarily be thought of as mutually 
exclusive. These researchers argue that a hybrid approach can ‘enrich the default metric from a 
Merton type model’and therefore accounting variables can be ‘incrementally informative to market-
based measures’. As a consequence, we draw from both traditional and structural models in the 
derivation of testable propositions, see Equation (1). 
The initial specification that was fitted to the data is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Log(OAS ) represents the natural logarithm of OAS on bond i at time t. is the defined benefit 
pension risk (variously defined) of the firm who issues bond i at time t. and 
represent long- and short-term leverage. , , and are equityvolatility, growth rate, 
firm size and return on investment respectively. DUR are dummies to control the four duration bands. 
is also a dummy variable which is used to represent the two digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code for the firm issuing bond i at time t. The SIC code dummies are used to 
control the fixed effects at the industry level. Analysis of regression diagnostics indicated that several 
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two digit SIC codes dominate the sample. This causes excessive collinearity between the SIC 
dummies, which consequently inflates the variance estimates of the coefficients in the study. One 
solution is to reduce the number of dummies and as a result increase the number of firms in each 
category. This in practice is achieved by using two digit SIC codes for those industries which account 
for more than 4% of the sample, and one digit SIC codes otherwise. This reduces the variance 
inflation factors to an acceptable level below 10. Wave dummy variables control aggregate effects 
suspected to be fixed in the time dimension. As such, the specification represents a between-effects 
panel estimator. 
Equation (1) performs the analysis assuming that the pension–credit risk relationship is 
uniform across the countries in the sample. Such an assumption is questionable because there are 
country-specific differences in pension protection provisions, accounting standards, disclosure 
requirements and actuarial modelling techniques. If this is the case it may imply that there are 
significant cross country variation in the magnitude of the pension risk coefficients. To test for 
country-specific effects, Equation (1) has been adapted to include interaction terms between the 
country dummies and the pension risk measure. In terms of assigning the country dummies, five 
countries dominated the sample thereby making collinearity a problem. Therefore, as with the SIC 
groups, if a country represented more than 4% of the overall sample, it remained as a distinct country 
group. If not it was grouped in a category entitled ‘Other’. This led to distinct groups for France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US.  represents the country dummy variable for 
the company that issues bond i at time t. The adjusted specification is as follows:  
 
 
 
In Equation (2), the original pension risk variable ( ) is dropped from the specification. 
This is undertaken to avoid perfect multi-collinearity with the pension risk interaction variables (
). In this study, we have included interactions for all countries. Some researchers 
prefer to include the original pension risk measure and n−1 interaction terms, where n is the number 
of countries. However, this approach requires that in order to analyse the coefficients one must do so 
in reference to the base category (i.e. the country that is dropped). This is an inconvenience when one 
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is dealing with many countries in a sample. Dropping the original pension risk measure and including 
interactions for all countries is referred to as the ‘partition approach’ and in this multi-country 
specification is more intuitively appealing.10 
 
5. Empirical findings 
A correlation matrix of a selection of variables used in the specifications is presented in Table 3. 
We note that, in general, the various definitions of the pension risk measure are highly positively 
correlated with each other, the STLEV and LTLEV variables are negatively correlated and there is 
quite a high correlation between FS and several other explanatory variables. All variance inflation 
factors fall below the cut-off point of 10.0, therefore variance estimates are efficient and multi-
collinearity is not an issue. 
In Table 4, the empirical results are presented in Equation (1). We present estimates for four 
models, which differ depending upon the definition of pension risk utilized. Coefficient estimates, 
standard errors and t -statistics are detailed. The use of a log linear specification ensures that the 
regression residuals more closely approximate a normal distribution. This was confirmed by 
approximating normal plots of kernel density functions for the residuals in each of the four 
models.11 
Across all four specifications, R-squared is approximately 47% and all specifications pass the 
F test of joint significance. The key variable of interest in Table 4 is that of pension risk. The 
coefficient estimates on this variable are positive with three of the four significant at acceptable 
levels. This implies that the bond market (via the OAS on corporate debt) prices the risk of the 
defined benefit pension plan variously measured. This finding is consistent with the corporate 
financial perspective and agrees with the findings of, for example, Carroll and Niehaus (1998) and 
Cardinale (2006). Of the various pension risk facets, BS4 is most aggressively priced, while BS2 is 
not priced. A coefficient of 0.39 on BS4 implies that one-tenth of a unit12 increase in the ratio of the 
defined benefit pension deficit to total assets increases the credit spread by e0.3888/10 − 1 = 
3.96%. In comparison, one-tenth of a unit increase in the ratio of pension liabilities to total assets 
(BS1) increases the credit spread by roughly e0.1769/10 − 1 = 1.78%. That the market reacts more 
aggressively to unfunded liabilities as opposed to absolute liabilities is no surprise. In addition, the 
coefficient on BS3 is highly significant and implies that one-tenth of a unit increase in the ratio of the 
pension deficit to shareholder equity increases the credit spread by roughly e0.07650/10 − 1 = 0.77%. 
In Table 4, a range of control variables has also been introduced. Only two variables prove 
unimportant: GR and STLEV. It is interesting to note that while STLEV is insignificant, the 
LTLEV variable proves significant in all cases. This finding is supported elsewhere in the literature 
by Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998) and Cardinale (2006), all documenting that LTLEV rather 
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than STLEV is a predictor of credit risk. It is also interesting to note that the coefficients on LTLEV 
are sizeable and suggest that one-tenth of a unit increase in the ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
can increase the credit spread by as much as e0.7788/10 − 1 = 8.10% to e0.8510/10 − 1 = 8.88%. 
The specifications also show that there is a significant term structure effect in the corporate spreads. 
The coefficients on the duration bands increase as the time of maturity increases. This is an expected 
finding as the debt holder is exposed to risk over a longer period on purchasing bonds of longer 
maturities, therefore he must be compensated by a maturity-related risk premium. The wave dummies 
capture variation due to aggregate factors and are significant across specifications. 
All coefficient estimates are lower than that of the base (omitted) dummy corresponding to 2002, 
which implies that post-2002 companies had lower spreads on the debt they issued. Of the years in 
which spreads were observed, they were smallest in 2004. The coefficient estimates on both FS and 
ROI are in each case negative and significant. This implies that larger firms with a higher ROI have a 
lower credit spread on the corporate debt that they issue. This is expected as firms with better 
operating performance are more likely to be able to service future debt claims. In addition, larger 
firms offer more security to debt holders in the event of bankruptcy. Finally,VOL is positive and 
significant. This is in keeping with the empirical findings of structural models of credit risk and is 
often overlooked in traditional accounting ratio-based models. 
In Table 5, we present the results for reworked specifications in which we control differential 
pension–credit risk relationships between countries that are addressed by including interaction terms 
between the country dummies and the pension risk measure. Individual countries are analysed where 
they represent more than 4% of the overall sample resulting in coefficient estimates for France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. Remaining countries are categorised under ‘Other’. 
The total number of bonds (1828) in the cross country analysis (Table 5) is less than the 
number of bonds (1907) used in the original analysis (Table 4). This is due to the fact that there were 
quite a few off-shore issuer countries (e.g. Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and the Dutch Antilles) and 
were omitted from the sample to avoid wrongly including bonds ultimately issued by firms in larger 
countries in a smaller subgroup. Should this off-shore country be a haven for firms issuing debt, its 
category may then contain bonds ultimately issued by companies in more than one country. 
Compared to the original specification, the extended specification results in a slight 
explanatory improvement. The R-squared values increase and now range from 50 to 55%. All 
specifications pass the F test of joint significance. The sign, magnitude and significance of the 
variables included as controls are very much in line with those detailed in Table 4 and therefore 
analysis of their marginal effects remains as earlier. 
Of the countries examined, it appears that the pension–credit risk relation is significant in 
Germany, the US and the category ‘Other’. Traces of the relationship are found in the UK with the 
BS3 specification, but no significant relation is found in either France or the Netherlands. In both 
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Germany and the US, where the relationship is significant across all specifications, once again the 
market most aggressively prices BS4 (defined benefit pension deficit/total assets). In the US, one-
tenth of a unit increase in the ratio of unfunded pension liabilities to total assets increases corporate 
credit spreads by roughly e5.8375/10 − 1 = 79%. An identical pension risk increase in Germany 
increases credit spreads by roughly e2.0278/10 − 1 = 22%. By comparison, one-tenth of a unit 
increase in the ratio of defined benefit pension liabilities to total assets (BS1) causes a credit spread 
increase of 16 and 11% in the US and Germany, respectively. The UK debt market prices pension risk 
BS3, i.e. deficit as a proportion of shareholder equity. One-tenth of a unit increase in this ratio 
increases the spreads of UK companies by 0.26% much lower than that of their US and German 
counterparts where this amount is 6.20 and 5.17%, respectively. 
The pension–credit risk relationship is clearly not uniform across countries. This raises the question 
why might this be so? One argument might be that there are sophistication differences between 
markets that may result in differential capacities to price risk. In the context of this analysis, which 
identifies the highly developed financial markets of the US and the UK at different ends of the 
pension risk pricing spectrum, we would suggest that market sophistication is not an explanation. 
Earlier in the analysis we identified informational frictions. For example, financial reporting of 
pensions has been somewhat opaque with studies demonstrating that more transparent accounting 
standards negatively impact on the valuation of companies running pension plan deficits. There is also 
a lack of consistency of actuarial assumptions utilized in the calculation of pension plan funding 
particularly with respect to the discount rate, inflation rate, salary increases, return on equity and 
mortality rates. In addition, the role of a pension benefit guarantee fund, as guarantor of pension 
benefits, may cloud the relationship between the risk of the pension plan and market risk. It is in these 
informational frictions that we may find an explanation for the intercountry differential capacities to 
price pension risk. The implication being that these frictions differ across countries. While we do not 
seek to empirically attribute the inter-country differences in the pricing of pension risk to specific 
informational frictions, it is perhaps informative at this juncture to briefly highlight why some of these 
factors may be of potential importance. 
If we consider accounting disclosure, the primary standards in Europe are IAS19 and FRS17 
with, for example, FRS17 issued in 2000 in the UK as an attempt to ensure that financial statements 
reflect at fair value the assets and liabilities arising from an employer’s retirement benefit obligations 
in the accounting periods in which they arise. The primary standard in the US is 
FAS87. The latter has attracted criticism with Soroosh and Espahbodi (2007) stating that ‘[under 
FAS87] the users of the financial statements have to plough through the footnotes to gain even a 
limited understanding of the impact of [pension] obligations’. Consequently, standard FAS158 was 
introduced in September 2006 closely mirroring the FRS17 requirements with respect to pension 
reporting. This suggests that pension disclosure was more transparent in the UK and Europe relative 
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to the US. One line of argument might then be that the opacity in connection with US pension 
accounting disclosures resulted in investors in US firms being unable to properly gauge the risk posed 
by a defined benefit scheme. As a consequence, investors may require an additional risk premium to 
compensate for uncertainty surrounding the funded status of the scheme. 
Actuarial valuation of pension scheme liabilities are based on deterministic assumptions 
regarding scheme attributes such as the discount rate, inflation rate, salary increases, return on equity 
and mortality rates. Not only are there pronounced differences across countries, but there is also an 
enormous unexplained variation in the results of actuarial valuations to determine pension scheme 
liabilities within countries. For example, PriceWaterhouse Coopers (2007) in a survey of 
90 UK pension schemes document that common variations in the actuarial assumptions utilized can 
mean a swing of as much as an extra 25% either way in the calculated liabilities without apparent 
justification. They state that assumptions used to calculate liabilities should be based on the particular 
circumstances of the scheme and its sponsoring employer, but in reality they appear to be chosen 
more randomly’. Given the country-specific nature of demographic and certain economic 
assumptions, it could reasonably be argued that this translates into a variation as to how pension risk 
is priced internationally. 
Inter-country differences in the pricing relationship could also arguably be due to the 
availability/operational sophistication of pension benefit guarantee schemes.Aproper functioning 
protection mechanism provides credible underwrite to the pension promise and in consequence can be 
expected to cloud the pension risk: credit risk relationship. Stewart (2007) contrasts schemes that are 
poorly designed such as that in the US with others that have superior design features such as the UK 
scheme. Those schemes that are not appropriately designed, encourage moral hazard, lack credibility 
and therefore in these countries the relationship between pension–credit risk may be more visible. In 
the case of the US Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) criticisms have been voiced for its 
exposure to political interference and because premiums do not take into account the probability of 
participant bankruptcy, the composition of neither the firm’s pension ,assets nor any asset liability 
mismatch. In contrast, the UK Pension Protection Fund (PPF), while loosely based on the PBGC is 
not subject to political interference, is self-financing, and the board of the PPF have freedom to 
determine the levy structure. In addition, the PPF levy (premium) features a risk factor element linked 
to the level of underfunding, investment strategy and the sponsor’s credit rating. 
 
6. Concluding comments 
 
This paper examined the link between credit risk and pension liabilities using an econometric 
specification, which builds upon traditional accounting-based ratio models and market-based 
structural models of credit spreads. Traditional and structural variables were supplemented with 
variables designed to reflect the risk of a company’s defined benefit pension plan. The empirical test 
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was carried out using corporate bonds denominated in Euro, which encompass the US and European 
data largely for the period 2002–2006. The initial model revealed that defined benefit pension risk, 
variously measured, is a significant determinant of the OAS on corporate debt. This lends support to 
the view that debt markets are informationally efficient with regard to pension disclosures. 
Additionally, the analysis justifies the corporate financial perspective regarding the treatment of 
pension assets and liabilities. Our initial analysis also suggested that unfunded pension liabilities were 
not priced as aggressively as traditional leverage and this contrasts with the work of Cardinale (2006). 
A term structure effect was also noted. This is consistent with debt holders requiring a maturity-
related risk premium as they are exposed to risk over a longer period when purchasing longer dated 
bonds.  
An extended model was then formulated to permit closer examination of the pension–credit 
risk relationship by country with the implicit assumption being that heterogeneity exists. The 
empirical results revealed that the pension–credit risk relation is most prominent in the US and 
Germany, partially evident in the UK and not evident in France and the Netherlands. Additionally, in 
the US and Germany, unfunded pension liabilities are priced much more aggressively than traditional 
leverage by factors of 10 and 3, respectively. One implication of this finding is that for firms in the 
US and Germany running pension deficits, the preferred solution from a cost perspective, would be to 
borrow to finance the pension deficit. 
In an attempt to explain why heterogeneity emerges in the pension–credit risk relation, we consider 
inter-country differences in accounting disclosure, actuarial assumptions and pension protection 
mechanisms. In this paper, we do not empirically test the role played by these factors which could be 
perceived as a limitation of the study. As part of our future research agenda, we therefore propose to 
undertake a firm-based inter-country event-study specifically focusing on changes in accounting 
disclosure and the pension protection premium. The event-study method will analyse the yield spread 
response of corporate bonds in an observation window spanning different periods pre and post the 
event under investigation. Abnormal excess returns will be calculated and assessed after correcting 
yield spreads in a market model that relates the corporate-specific yield to the appropriate benchmark 
(in our case, IBOXXEuro Corporate Index). 
In addition a further extension of our research agenda will be an investigation of the implications of 
pension risk in the rapidly expanding Credit Default Swap market. 
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Notes 
 
1. The media has latched onto the term ‘the Perfect Storm’ to describe the funding crisis. The idea behind this term is that 
post-2001 a combination of falling equity markets and declining interest rates resulted in a rapid deterioration in funding 
positions. 
2. Lane, Clark, and Peacock (2008) report that deficits are on the rise again as the subprime mortgage crisis has caused 
deterioration in funding positions. 
3. Cotter, Blake, and Dowd (2007) present an interesting overview of the financial risks faced by the UK PPF. Also 
considered is the experience with other government-sponsored insurance schemes such as the US Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation. The authors conclude that the PPF will live under the permanent risk of insolvency as a consequence 
of the moral hazard, adverse selection and, especially, systemic risks that it faces. 
4. Some non-European firms issue debt denominated in Euro therefore are represented as part of this index 
5. In the extreme, Black (2006) and Tepper (1981) further point out that if the pension fund is invested in more heavily taxed 
assets such as bonds, the corporation should fund its pension plan to the maximum amount allowed by the tax authority in 
order to maximize the value of the tax shelter to the shareholders. 
6. In order to discourage the moral hazard associated with the pension put option, pension benefit guarantee schemes used 
risk-based premiums, supervision and differential levels of support. 
7. Carroll and Niehaus (1998) cite the mandated sharing of excess pension assets as the primary reason for the asymmetry. 
While the sponsoring firm has an obligation to cover any funding shortfall, a funding surplus must be partially shared with 
members of the scheme. Correspondingly, scheme members are exposed to upside return but no downside risk. 
8. The purest form of the Merton model uses asset volatility as an explanatory variable; however, Jones, Mason, and 
Rosenfeld (1984) show that because the equity value is a function of the asset value, one can apply Ito’s Lemma to 
determine the instantaneous volatility of the equity from the asset volatility. 
9. Bohn, Arora, and Korablev (2005) argue that KMV–Merton models capture all the information in traditional agency 
ratings and well known accounting variables, while Wang and Suo (2006) shows that KMV–Merton probabilities have 
significant predictive power in a model of default probabilities over time. 
10. For more information on the choice between the base and partition approach seeYip and Tsang (2007). 
11. The kernel density functions are available from the authors on request. 
12. Standard convention in analysing the coefficients of a log-linear model observes the resultant percentage change in the 
dependent variable from a unit change in the independent variable. The independent variables in this study are financial 
ratios and quite often the denominator is substantially larger than the numerator and consequently the average values of most 
of the independent variables are of the magnitude of tenths of units. Therefore, it is more intuitively appealing from an 
economic point of view to observe the marginal effect of one-tenth of a unit change in the independent variable on the 
dependent variable. One-tenth of a unit shifts in this case represent significant movements in the independent variables, 
where unit shifts would be highly unlikely in economic terms. 
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Tables  
 
Table 1. Total observations by country and time. 
 
Issuer country 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 All years Total (%) 
Australia 9 9 6 4 0 28 1.47 
Belgium 4 3 2 1 0 10 0.52 
Canada 3 2 3 3 3 14 0.73 
Denmark 4 6 7 6 2 25 1.31 
Finland 9 8 3 4 1 25 1.31 
France 81 77 37 24 13 232 12.17 
Germany 33 27 23 22 14 119 6.24 
Ireland 15 10 8 4 1 38 1.99 
Italy 13 11 0 0 0 24 1.26 
Japan 7 6 5 1 1 20 1.05 
Luxembourg 19 14 10 6 1 50 2.62 
Netherlands 120 119 93 85 66 483 25.33 
Portugal 2 2 2 2 2 10 0.52 
Spain 5 3 0 0 0 8 0.42 
Sweden 12 12 10 5 0 39 2.05 
UK 97 91 74 64 21 347 18.20 
USA 106 76 68 70 36 356 18.67 
Residual* 25 22 16 10 6 79 4.14 
Grand total 564 498 367 311 167 1907 100 
Total (%) 29.58 26.11 19.24 16.31 8.76 100 – 
*Note: Residual countries include Austria, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Iceland, The Dutch 
Antilles, Norway and Jersey. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis. 
 
Variable Obs Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
OAS 1907 55.3802 33.9990 32.0000 46.0000 66.0000 
Log(OAS) 1907 3.8501 0.5589 3.4657 3.8286 4.1897 
BS1 1907 0.1136 0.1673 0.0125 0.0434 0.1667 
BS2 1907 0.4095 0.6689 0.0400 0.1302 0.4852 
BS3 1907 0.2231 0.6248 0.0202 0.0929 0.1915 
BS4 1907 0.0290 0.0451 0.0014 0.0080 0.0433 
LTLev 1907 0.2082 0.1367 0.0981 0.1900 0.2917 
STLev 1907 0.1365 0.0998 0.0519 0.1135 0.2106 
VOL 1907 25.6057 7.3812 20.6507 24.8405 28.8450 
GR 1907 0.0314 0.0793 −0.0132 0.0231 0.0555 
ROI 1907 0.0255 0.0455 0.0065 0.0141 0.0394 
FS 1907 5.0546 0.7319 4.4432 5.0415 5.7663 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix of variables used in the analysis. 
 
  Log(OAS) BS1 BS2 BS3 BS4 LTLEV STLEV VOL GR ROI FS 
Log(OAS) 1.0000                     
BS1 0.0984 1.0000                   
BS2 0.0340 0.8171 1.0000                 
BS3 0.1371 0.4151 0.2171 1.0000               
BS4 0.1083 0.6527 0.5385 0.4940 1.0000             
LTLev 0.2313 0.2816 −0.0137 0.2173 0.1968 1.0000           
STLev −0.1395 −0.2993 −0.3941 −0.0802 −0.2727 −0.2217 1.0000         
VOL 0.1969 −0.1023 −0.0176 −0.0028 −0.0554 −0.1911 0.0205 1.0000       
GR −0.1369 −0.2076 −0.1321 −0.1115 −0.1723 −0.1864 0.1192 −0.0215 1.0000     
ROI −0.1129 0.3117 0.3243 0.0187 0.1548 0.0742 −0.2446 −0.2708 0.1191 1.0000   
FS −0.2447 −0.4698 −0.4101 −0.1567 −0.4259 −0.4417 0.5458 0.1344 0.1878 −0.4122 1.0000 
22 
 
 
Table 4. The determinants of option adjusted spreads. 
 
Coefficient BS1 BS2 BS3 BS4 
PR variables 0.1769*** 0.01611 0.07650*** 0.3888* 
  0.0589 0.0153 0.0232 0.2308 
  3.0050 1.0524 3.2926 1.6849 
LTLEV 0.8121*** 0.8510*** 0.7788*** 0.8431*** 
  0.1005 0.1029 0.0981 0.1012 
  8.0783 8.2679 7.9369 8.3302 
STLEV −0.1988 −0.1782 −0.2230 −0.2038 
  0.1454 0.1472 0.1447 0.1455 
  −1.3677 −1.2108 −1.5411 −1.4007 
VOL 0.01401*** 0.01398*** 0.01375*** 0.01400*** 
  0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 
  8.8997 8.8635 8.4846 8.8956 
GR 0.02803 0.003236 −0.007298 −0.004523 
  0.1262 0.1272 0.1262 0.1262 
  0.2221 0.0254 −0.0578 −0.0358 
ROI −1.3817*** −1.3223*** −1.2945*** −1.2777*** 
  0.2904 0.2892 0.2826 0.2824 
  −4.7571 −4.5721 −4.5811 −4.5239 
23 
 
 
FS −0.2304*** −0.2333*** −0.2336*** −0.2308*** 
  0.0236 0.0236 0.0236 0.0234 
  −9.7600 −9.8803 −9.9069 −9.8627 
DUR2 0.1658*** 0.1636*** 0.1686*** 0.1638*** 
  0.0282 0.0282 0.0278 0.0282 
  5.8888 5.8029 6.0639 5.8140 
DUR3 0.5006*** 0.4971*** 0.5018*** 0.4965*** 
  0.0252 0.0253 0.0250 0.0252 
  19.8469 19.6765 20.1119 19.6890 
DUR4 0.8651*** 0.8630*** 0.8633*** 0.8618*** 
  0.0324 0.0325 0.0323 0.0325 
  26.7158 26.5861 26.6971 26.5243 
WAVE2003 −0.4792*** −0.4791*** −0.4807*** −0.4791*** 
  0.0483 0.0483 0.0474 0.0484 
  −9.9126 −9.9101 −10.1333 −9.9067 
WAVE2004 −0.6083*** −0.6094*** −0.5979*** −0.6086*** 
  0.0472 0.0473 0.0456 0.0472 
  −12.8820 
 
−12.8968 −13.1185 −12.8868 
24 
 
 
 
 
WAVE2005 −0.5835*** −0.5859*** −0.5732*** −0.5836*** 
  0.0481 0.0481 0.0465 0.0480 
  −12.1413 −12.1892 −12.3249 −12.1542 
WAVE2006 −0.3921*** −0.3963*** −0.3798*** −0.3921*** 
  0.0460 0.0460 0.0443 0.0460 
  −8.5212 −8.6058 −8.5767 −8.5260 
Constant 4.6366*** 4.6587*** 4.6630*** 4.6430*** 
  0.1388 0.1389 0.1395 0.1374 
  33.4149 33.5385 33.4373 33.7842 
Observations 1907 1907 1907 1907 
R-squared 0.4736 0.4720 0.4782 0.4725 
 
Notes: SIC dummy estimates not reported due to large number. Robust standard errors reported. ***Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level 
and *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5. The determinants of option adjusted spreads with country-specific adjustment.  
 
Coefficient BS1 BS2 BS3 BS4 
PR variation 
LTLEV 0.7377*** 0.7843*** 0.6220*** 0.7812*** 
  0.1014 0.1049 0.0949 0.1029 
  7.2772 7.4796 6.5550 7.5896 
STLEV 0.1350 0.1320 0.1420 0.1060 
  0.1547 0.1566 0.1489 0.1527 
  0.8728 0.8427 0.9532 0.6942 
VOL 0.01323*** 0.01236*** 0.01368*** 0.01329*** 
  0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 
  7.7813 7.4273 8.2273 7.9290 
GR 0.1873 0.1402 0.09245 0.07173 
  0.1330 0.1350 0.1307 0.1317 
  1.4086 1.0383 0.7074 0.5448 
ROI −1.5309*** −1.6053*** −1.5061*** −1.3629*** 
  0.2905 0.2973 0.2959 0.2954 
  −5.2702 
 
−5.3992 −5.0897 −4.6139 
26 
 
FS −0.3299*** −0.3154*** −0.3210*** −0.2817*** 
  0.0299 0.0304 0.0296 0.0308 
  −11.0226 −10.3746 −10.8376 −9.1562 
DUR2 0.1879*** 0.1794*** 0.2072*** 0.1966*** 
  0.0270 0.0274 0.0255 0.0268 
  6.9538 6.5599 8.1345 7.3424 
DUR3 0.5247*** 0.5111*** 0.5383*** 0.5277*** 
  0.0245 0.0248 0.0235 0.0248 
  21.4614 20.5719 22.8959 21.2779 
DUR4 0.8781*** 0.8644*** 0.8851*** 0.8822*** 
  0.0324 0.0323 0.0318 0.0325 
  27.1359 26.7939 27.8045 27.1853 
WAVE2003 −0.5003*** −0.4974*** −0.4361*** −0.4892*** 
  0.0460 0.0473 0.0426 0.0459 
  −10.8821 −10.5080 −10.2475 −10.6626 
WAVE2004 −0.6051*** −0.6120*** −0.5380*** −0.5997*** 
  0.0454 0.0466 0.0419 0.0450 
  −13.3404 
 
−13.1212 −12.8395 −13.3370 
27 
 
WAVE2005 −0.5783*** −0.5854*** −0.5062*** −0.5686*** 
  0.0469 0.0479 0.0433 0.0465 
  −12.3278 −12.2162 −11.6927 −12.2184 
WAVE2006 −0.3801*** −0.3928*** −0.3058*** −0.3700*** 
  0.0450 0.0460 0.0414 0.0448 
  −8.4511 −8.5467 −7.3864 −8.2568 
PRFRANCE 0.2694 0.01451 0.09596 0.3305 
  0.4872 0.0717 0.2846 1.6956 
  0.5530 0.2026 0.3371 0.1949 
PRGERMANY 1.0135*** 0.07716 0.5045*** 2.0278*** 
  0.3789 0.0740 0.1202 0.6118 
  2.6748 1.0422 4.1989 3.3145 
PRNETHERLANDS 0.05623 0.004322 −0.02125 0.3420 
  0.1019 0.0168 0.0349 0.3671 
  0.5518 0.2570 −0.6087 0.9318 
PRUK −0.02222 −0.02285 0.02631*** −0.06310 
  0.0797 0.0290 0.0087 0.4263 
  −0.2788 
 
−0.7877 3.0250 −0.1480 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
PRUS 1.5227*** 0.1441** 0.6015*** 5.8375*** 
  0.3827 0.0629 0.0725 1.7551 
  3.9785 2.2912 8.2980 3.3261 
PROTHER 0.8118*** 0.2125*** −0.02188 0.5420 
  0.2758 0.0610 0.0222 0.5272 
  2.9438 3.4856 −0.9858 1.0281 
Constant 4.9487*** 4.9784*** 4.7900*** 4.6726*** 
  0.1792 0.1809 0.1835 0.1899 
  27.6207 27.5180 26.1010 24.6017 
Observations 1828 1828 1828 1828 
R-squared 0.5143 0.5005 0.5477 0.5098 
 
Notes: SIC and country dummy estimates not reported due to large number. Robust standard errors reported. ***Significant at the 1% level, 
**significant at the 5% level and *significant at the 10% level. 
